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Teaching Supplemental Jurisdiction
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL"
Most of this Symposium properly addresses the merits* of the current
supplemental jurisdiction statute and its proposed revisions. I have homelier
ambitions, in pursuit of which I hope to avoid a serious problem. Writing for a
symposium on supplemental jurisdiction to which David Shapiro is contributing
is a bit like agreeing to say a few words to God about theology. To avoid the fate
that such hubris might entail, these notes instead offer some thoughts about the
way in which doctrinal changes affect students' learning. To stay momentarily
with my metaphor, these thoughts address not theology but the teaching of
theology. In the process, I want to suggest that among the various weaknesses in
the present codification, weaknesses anatomized elsewhere, lies one great,
abiding strength: the present version of 28 U.S.C. § 1367' connects supplemental
jurisdiction not just to the Constitution but to the humbler world of adjudicative
procedure. For the sake of the law as well as of our students, let us hope that
current revisions do not sever that link.
For all these virtues, however, the current statute poses a problem. Because the
statute is so tightly linked to the rest of the procedural system, one cannot entirely
understand it until one has mastered most of civil procedure. But because the
statute embeds itself so thoroughly in existing procedure, one similarly cannot
understand that procedure without understanding the statute. Supplemental
jurisdiction in its present form thus presents a particularly egregious form of the
seamless web problem. In the next few pages I suggest how one might approach
the web without tearing it apart; I start with the story of how the web took on its
present shape.
I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AS A PEDAGOGICAL GAP-FILLER
In the beginning, pleading (the old version of the modem procedure course)
touched federal jurisdiction not at all.2 As Mary Brigid McManamon has recently
taught us, the modem civil procedure course emerged after fighting a prolonged
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I thank Bill Rubenstein for comments on an
earlier draft of this piece.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
2. For our purposes 1938 is sufficiently close to the beginning that the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary. An unsystematic survey of procedure casebooks published around
1938 reminds us how lately this Johnny has come. Of about 2600 pages, I found six pages that
discussed any aspect of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Of these six pages, two contained
a bare mention of diversity jurisdiction and four dealt in passing with ancillary jurisdiction in
connection withjoinder. See CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (2d ed.
1940); JAMES P. McBAINE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMON LAw PLEADING (2d ed. 1941);
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CODE PLEADING (1940).
As late as 1967, Scott and Kent's second edition devoted only 13 out of 1100 pages to
federal subject matter jurisdiction. See AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & ROBERT BRYDON KENT,
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1967).
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rear-guard action with common law pleading.' Long after common-law pleading
had vanished from the courts, law students imbibed its mysteries.4 Until almost
1950 many procedure courses (called, typically, "pleading and procedure")
devoted substantial time to the student's learning the elements of particular
common claims-breach of contract, debt, detinue, and the like.' Even Code
Pleading was thought either too evanescent or too practical to warrant students'
attention.6
Then came the Federal Rules ("Rules"), and their gradual, still-incomplete
colonization of state procedure.7 For several decades, that left procedure teachers
with an interesting problem: what to teach, now that pleading had disappeared?
Rule 8' had resolved-by postponing to a later stage-the problems of pleading,
on which much of the old procedure course had focused. That left a large hole
where most of the pre-war procedure course had been. One can understand the
last fifty years of curricular thought in this field as an effort to fill this hole with
material that would be at least arguably relevant to a lawyer and, probably equally
important, interesting to teach.
Two solutions have emerged, solutions that stand in some tension with each
other. One solution stresses the litigation process-the means by which courts
resolve contested matters of law and fact. Essentially, this topic encompasses
everything that happens in a lawsuit after pleading matters are over, borrowing
from and expanding on what would have been a "trial practice" course in 1938.
The contrasting solution is to stress jurisdictional matters, borrowing from what
might otherwise be taught in courses on federal jurisdiction and conflicts of law.
Both solutions have plausible underpinnings. Supplemental jurisdiction, in its
present codification, stands with feet in both camps.
In U.S. courts a substantial amount of dispositive pretrial adjudication occurs
in jurisdictional litigation. In federal courts less than 5% of filed civil cases reach
trial,9 but a dispositive judicial ruling ends about 30% of civil cases."0 As the
3. See Mary Brigid McManamon, The History of the Civil Procedure Course: A Study in
Evolving Pedagogy, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 397 (1998).
4. Professor McManamon tells the entertaining if slightly perverse story of law schools'
clinging to common law pleading for almost hafa century after it had vanished from practice.
See id. at 417-30.
5. For example, the author of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure devoted much of his
own casebook to separate chapters containing rules for pleading various different claims. See
CLARK, supra note 2 (172 pages on "Claims for Damages for Injuries to the Person"; 102 pages
to "Claims for Damages for Breach of Contract"; 20 pages on "Actions Concerning Chattels
and Land"; and a separate 40-page chapter on equity).
6. See McManamon, supra note 3, at 413.
7. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of
State Court Systems of Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367 (1986) (finding that 35 states had
adopted some version of the federal rules as their procedural code, with significant differences
in the forms of adoption).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
9. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 Wis. L. REV. 631, 633.
10. See id. at 636.
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end-point of most litigation has come to rest before trial," one would expect a
concurrently increased emphasis on that phase of litigation. That increased
emphasis has occurred: contemporary casebooks devote most of their attention
to issues that arise before trial begins.' Within that pretrial phase, jurisdictional
questions have come to occupy a very large part of contemporary U.S. legal
education in procedure. 3
This prominent position in part tracks the realities of practice: in federal
litigation jtrisdictional adjudications play a larger role than they did fifty years
ago. Among the federal cases that reach an adjudicated disposition, about
two-thirds are jurisdictional; fifty years ago only 5% of the adjudicated cases took
that route.' 4 By any measure this is a substantial basis for an increased treatment
of jurisdiction in law classes and textbooks.
I suspect, however, that these perfectly good reasons do not entirely account for
the change. Federal jurisdiction is complex, interesting, driven largely by doctrine
rather than by facts, and subject to continued common law evolution. All of these
features distinguish it from such topics as discovery, summary judgment, and the
pretrial process-all of which might have claims to more pedagogical time were
we collectively barred from importing pieces of federal jurisdiction into our
procedure courses. Whether for such reasons or because of the growth in
importance of the jurisdictional dismissal, most procedure courses now import
substantial pieces of what had once been the province of federal jurisdiction or
federal courts courses.
The importing has taken two forms, one in subject-matter jurisdiction, the other
in choice of law.' 5 In the former arena, no civil procedure casebook omits a
substantial chapter devoted to exploring the judicial jurisdiction of the federal
district courts. Seen from one standpoint this stance is remarkable: the federal
11. See id (explaining the long-term drop in civil trial rate and its replacement by pretrial
adjudication).
12. As examples of such emphasis, consider that BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK & TONI M.
MASSARO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS (1997), devote 68% of their pages to
pretrial material, including jurisdiction and choice of law. Equivalent statistics for other
representative casebooks include: JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
MATERIALS (7th ed. 1997) (72%); RICHARD H. FIELD ETAL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE
IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (7th ed. 1997) (69%); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL (7th ed. 1994) (76%);
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1996) (78%).
13. See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH (2d ed.
1995) devote about 21% of their book to jurisdictional matters-a majority of those pages
dealing with personal jurisdiction. That statistic is representative: BABCOCK & MASSARO, supra
note 12 (17%); COUND ET AL., supra note 12 (16%); FIELD ET AL., supra note 12 (16%);
RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PURDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
QUESTIONS (2d ed. 1997) (21%); HAZARDETAL., supra note 12 (21%); YEAZELL, supra note
12(18%).
14. In 1990, 23% of adjudicated cases-thus about 7% of all filed cases-were ended by
ajurisdictional dismissal. See Yeazell, supra note 9, at 637.
15. A significant piece of booty seized in the federal raiding expedition was Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, which continues to play a role in many procedure courses, and about which
one might raise the same questions of centrality. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
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courts hear only about a quarter million of the six million major civil lawsuits
filed annually in the United States. 6 Yes, federal jurisdiction teaches our students
something about the distinctive division of power between state and federal
governments. But they are typically less capable of comprehending that division
before they have soaked themselves in constitutional law, which does not always
occur before they encounter federal subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, class
time devoted to this topic is almost inevitably taken from other topics which will
not find replication in other parts of the typical law school curriculum. This point
has even greater force in respect to supplemental jurisdiction. Until recently a
judicial gloss on the basic jurisdictional picture-a gloss confusingly divided into
subtopics of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, each with its own line of cases
and disputed theology-supplemental jurisdiction in a basic procedure course
would seem to be not just a luxury but an irresponsible frivolity.
None of these considerations has led me to stop teaching federal subject matter
jurisdiction (including supplemental jurisdiction), or to exclude it from the
procedure casebook I edit; nor do I argue that it should. But the status of
supplemental jurisdiction should lead us to think about how to connect this
apparently peripheral topic to a central concern of a procedure course: the legal
construction of a method for hearing disputed issues of fact and law. Unless one
can connect jurisdiction to those concerns, one should think carefully before
spending much time on the topic. Until the codification of supplemental-
jurisdiction doctrine, the connection was difficult to make; it has recently become
more complex but less difficult. Indeed, one can argue-tentatively-that the
existing codification of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute strengthens the case
for including it in a civil procedure course, even a civil procedure course that
emphasizes the litigation process. To state that argument, one must look again
at the history of the course.
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND THE VANISHING
CAUSE OF ACTION
Ironically, the development that made it attractive for procedure to colonize
federal jurisdiction also made harder to link parts of the course. The key move
was the rise of notice pleading. Federal question jurisdiction was born in a world
of common law and code pleading. In that environment, the idea of a
well-pleaded complaint meant something rather specific. In consequence, cases
like Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley"7 made sense: in either regime one
could with some specificity speak of what it meant to plead a case for breach of
contract. Further, with such a notion in mind, one could, without circularity
discuss whether a federal element was part of such a well-pleaded complaint."
16. The figure is taken from CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, STATE JUSTICE INST.
& NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT
1992, at 41 (1994). It represents civil cases filed in state courts of general jurisdiction, which
typically have exclusive power to grant injunctions and award damages without limit.
17. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
18. See Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal
Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REv. 395, 410-14 (1976).
[Vol. 74:241
TEACHING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
That began to change in 1938. Not all at once, but steadily, pleading became
less an exercise in replicating a form with variations and more a matter of
gesturing in the general direction of a body of law. Conley v. Gibson9 is the locus
classicus, and the language of that case may say more than the Court really
meant-at least outside the civil rights context. But it has become a rare case that
gets dismissed on demurrer, and the common wisdom among litigators is that
there isn't much point in filing most demurrers except as a way of educating one's
opponents at the clients' expense.2" Though some may mourn the passing of
pleading,2 the consensus holds that it was not an ennobling art, and the only real
debate is whether the "cure"-discovery-is worse than the disease.
But if pleading is no longer an art, it becomes much more difficult to describe
a well-pleaded complaint and, accordingly, more difficult to describe its
antithesis-the badly pleaded complaint. And it is in this difficulty that the grand
irony of modern procedural pedagogy lies. For just at the time when it became
attractive to procedure teachers to replace the old learning with forays into
federal jurisdiction, it became much more difficult to help students understand
just what it was that triggered federal question jurisdiction. As William Cohen has
pointed out,22 it was not easy before the advent of notice pleading, but it has
certainly become more difficult since. Professor Cohen has noted: "The
'well-pleaded' requirement will not yield to good, pragmatic reasons .... That
is because its sole justification is to provide a rule of thumb permitting the
determination ofjurisdiction on the face of the complaint."23
And all these problems exist when one considers the "simple" matter of original
jurisdiction. Turning to ancillary or pendent jurisdiction, to use the pre-code
terms, one had to consider how a part of a case was related to another part, which
in turn had to satisfy an arbitrary and incoherently stated relationship to federal
law. Such a relationship produced, doubtless, great fun for teachers, who could
always ask two or three more unanswerable questions about pendent jurisdiction.
Much less clear is whether it produced a degree of illumination in students
commensurate with the time spent on the topic.
19. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
20. The statement risks overbreadth. Richard Marcus has recently reminded us that courts
do not uniformly adhere to the principles set forth in Conley. Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling
Persistence ofPleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998). But outside the realm of hotly
contested arenas like civil rights and environmental law, pleading is not a challenging art at
present.
21. Stephen Subrin is its most distinguished and persuasive elegist. Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
22. William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That A Case Arise "Directly"
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967).
23.Id. at 915.
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III. CODIFICATION: JURISDICTION JOINS PROCEDURE
The enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 changed this picture. Whatever else the
codifiers may have wrought-including confusion-they managed in a
remarkably brief space to link supplemental jurisdiction with real Rules and real
case situations. The compact statute establishes a broad jurisdictional grant in
subsection (a) and then retracts much of that grant in subsection (b), whose
restrictions apply to diversity-only cases.
That much is unremarkable. The interesting part of the statute lies in the way
it achieves its selective retraction of supplemental jurisdiction, by listing specific
jurisdictional statutes, parties, and Rules. Only claims "by plaintiffs" against
parties joined under enumerated Rules are barred, and then only if the sole basis
for jurisdiction is diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.24
Others have canvassed the defects in this scheme. I want instead, in passing, to
praise it. It is specific (even when it should perhaps be more general), and it is
eminently teachable. Let me be clear. There is more to a jurisdictional statute than
the ease with which law students can grasp them. And I leave entirely to one side
whether it was wise to be so generous with federal question and so stingy with
diversity. But clarity cannot be a vice in a statute that must be applied on the
pleadings, at an early stage of a lawsuit. Judges and their clerks-recent law
students by and large-are in need of as much clarity as can be handily achieved.
Would it be too much to hope that the recodification effort now underway would
preserve as much of the brevity, as much of the clarity, and as much of the
reference to specific Rules as possible?2"
For the virtue of subsection (b) is that it enables student and lawyer to see
rather quickly whether there is a colorable argument for supplemental
jurisdiction. Is the case a diversity-only case? If so, who is making the claim for
which one needs supplemental jurisdiction? If the party is a plaintiff, is the claim
being brought against a party joined under one of the enumerated Rules? If so, the
conversation ends. If not, then there must be a perhaps-complex conversation
about "case or controversy." But that conversation is inevitable given the history
of the constitutional phrase. And it is a conversation that one encounters in a
federal question case, or, for that matter, in a res judicata case when one
considers whether the new claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
as a previously adjudicated claim. These inquiries also tell us whether-and
how-to incorporate supplemental jurisdiction into a basic civil procedure course.
The next section elaborates.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
25. In this respect it is not entirely comforting to see that the American Law Institute's
proposed remedy for the defects of the current statute includes a statute that runs to three pages
(about triple the length of the current statute), followed by an "explanatory note" of an
additional five, followed by a "commentary" of 140 pages. See AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT, TENTATIVE DRAFr NO. 2 (1998). Even a believer
in the validity of legislative history shudders to think of the perversions to which a "statutory"
history of that length might be turned.
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IV. TEACHING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
The sketch thus far has three points: that supplemental jurisdiction ought to be
a distinctly subordinate part of civil procedure; but it probably belongs
somewhere in the course; and that it belongs in a place where students can
understand its links both to federal jurisdiction and to the Rules. I shall briefly
defend each proposition.
The subordinate place of supplemental jurisdiction needs little demonstration:
it is, after all, an exception to the ordinary principles of original federal
jurisdiction, principles that should not be allowed to elbow aside more
fundamental concerns. If my argument has any force, it tends to magnify rather
than to diminish the place of supplemental jurisdiction. To the extent that the
present statute refers to specific Rules, it embeds supplemental jurisdiction more
firmly in the rest of the course.
Supplemental jurisdiction belongs in civil procedure only if and only because
it enables the student to explore these linkages: what does it mean for a plaintiff
to claim against a person made a party under Rule 14? Why should a person
joined as a plaintiff under Rule 19 not be able to avail herself of supplemental
jurisdiction? When is a claim so related to another that it forms part of the same
constitutional case or controversy? These questions require students to probe the
meaning of a claim and of the significance of the joinder possibilities under the
Rules. This justification also carries a negative corollary: unless supplemental
jurisdiction serves these ends in a procedure course, it does not pay its way and
should be replaced with something that does.
This justification implies as well a placement for supplemental jurisdiction.
There isn't any pedagogically ideal place to teach supplemental jurisdiction.
What one is shooting for is a location that will minimize the confusion. To
understand supplemental jurisdiction the student needs to understand three things:
basic jurisdictional doctrine, the idea of a claim, and the rules ofjoinder. Given
the number of hours allocated to most procedure courses, those three topics will
exhaust the course. Under these circumstances, the most helpful place to teach
supplemental jurisdiction is at the end of the course, in connection with the rules
of joinder themselves. Let me briefly defend this proposition, primarily by
explaining why supplemental jurisdiction seems to fit better here than it does
elsewhere.
Logically and analytically, of course, supplemental jurisdiction would be taught
as part of the presentation of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Having
encountered the doctrines that unexpectedly narrow federal question jurisdiction26
and diversity jurisdiction,2 7 the student might then encounter a doctrine that
expands jurisdiction in similarly unexpected ways. Such a presentation is
completely logical, and one can indeed brush the students up against Gibbs2' and
26. The well-pleaded complaint rule is the most notably counterintuitive example.
27. The complete diversity rule, the amount in controversy rule, and the domestic relations
exception are three such doctrines.
28. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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the statute. But unless one teaches subject matter jurisdiction after joinder, the
concepts in subsection (b) (referring to specific Rules) will make no sense at all.
So teaching § 1367 as part of jurisdiction-before students encounter
joinder-makes the students' job much more difficult than it need be.
Equally logical but equally unsatisfactory would be an approach that taught
supplemental jurisdiction as an adjunct to the consideration of res judicata.
Thinking about whether a claim is part of the same case or controversy as the
original claim is not very far removed from thinking about whether a claim is
sufficiently related to a previously decided claim to form part of "the same
transaction or occurrence," to use the test of the Second Restatement of
Judgments. 9 But, again, without a knowledge of the rules ofjoinder, the students
cannot make any sense of subsection (b).
That leaves the least undesirable placement of this material-in connection
with the rules ofjoinder themselves. As students encounter joinder concepts, they
can begin to understand the situations in which the statute does and doesn't bar
supplemental jurisdiction. This placement has an added advantage: many of the
joinder Rules contemplate the same inquiry into the relatedness of claims as is
contemplated by subsection (a). Whether a plaintiff may assert against a Rule 1430
third-party defendant a claim "arising out of the same transaction or occurrence"
as the subject matter of the original claim is not precisely the same question as
posed by the Case or Controversy Clause,3' but it is in the approximate
neighborhood.
So there is much to be said for teaching supplemental jurisdiction along with
the Rules ofjoinder to which the most complex of the statute's subsections refer.
But, for this scheme to work best, the student encountering joinder must have met
res judicata. Joinder mostly lives in the shadow of res judicata, and many of the
situations contemplated are incomprehensible unless a student understands why
joinder is necessary to achieve res judicata. Rule 1932 is a leading contender here,
but other Rules evince this concern as well.33
If one accepts the preceding arguments, one has also accepted a syllabus, or at
least two variations on a syllabus. The place for supplemental jurisdiction-or for
any deep exploration of it-is with the principles and Rules ofjoinder. And the
place for the principles of joinder is sometime after a consideration of res
judicata. And the place for res judicata is after one has examined the idea of
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 9 (1982). Mary Kay Kane has recently
come out against the sin of assuming that "transaction" means the same thing in different
procedural settings. See Mary Kay Kane, Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil
Procedure, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1723 (1998). I think it is possible to avoid this sin while
nevertheless discussing the forms that a "transaction" might take in different contexts.
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 14.
3 1. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
33. Rule 14 aims at avoiding two successive suits, in which the losing defendant in the first
suit encounters a third-party defendant who relitigates (because not bound) the underlying
liability. Interpleader is of course entirely about multiple and inconsistent liability. Rule 23,
though it has a different social function, expresses itself partly in terms of avoiding inconsistent
liability and obligations.
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pleading and discovery, so one can see just what is and isn't presented in a
lawsuit, and so one can understand why the apparently drastic principles of
modem res judicata are justified by the existence of discovery and the ease of
amended pleadings. Working backwards, then, one finds two patterns, with a
common ending point: joinder and supplemental jurisdiction. One can teach the
front end of the course in two ways, beginning either with jurisdiction or with the
litigation process (pleading through res judicata). If one begins with jurisdiction,
the litigation process follows. If one begins, as I have in recent years, with the
litigation process, then jurisdiction follows. 4 In either scenario, joinder and
supplemental jurisdiction end the course.
They end it in style, with a review of most major concepts encountered. For
joinder requires the student to revisit the rest of the material comprising most
first-year courses in procedure. Joinder questions are typically battles for res
judicata and battles about jurisdiction. At the entrance to most joinder questions,
the student encounters what might be called a "pleading" issue: is the
sought-to-be-joined claim so related to an existing one that it fits the terms of the
Rule in question? Many Rules pose this problem by posing a question about
"transaction or occurrence." That question asks students to revisit pleading and
former adjudication. Past that question, there are often questions either of
personal or of subject matter jurisdiction: assuming the Rule permits me to join
this party, does this court possess the requisite adjudicatory power over her?
Teaching the course this way achieves two goals. First, it enables students to
encounter joinder as a review connecting the two major parts of the course. That
is not a small virtue for a course whose major challenge is helping students
understand that the propositions explored have anything to do with each other.
Meeting them again at the end of the course in a series of Rules that combine
close textual reading with a reconsideration of the large principles has much to
be said for it. Second, it allows students to make some sense of what otherwise
look like arbitrary choices in the supplemental-jurisdiction statute. Why should
supplemental jurisdiction exist for Rule 13, 35 and for third-party plaintiffs in Rule
14,36 but not for claims by plaintiffs against third-party defendants? That question
may not admit of a completely satisfactory answer, but one has no chance of the
question's even being comprehensible unless students understand the basic
joinder ideas.
At its best, this placement of the material on supplemental jurisdiction will
leave students with the feeling that they have encountered a system whose parts
are not randomly ordered, and that they better understand what they have already
encountered. It makes jurisdiction not an orphan import from another course but
a part of a complex, though not incomprehensible, procedural system. It makes
pleading not an antique remnant of dubious value but the condition precedent to
thinking about judicial power. At its worst, this placement will at least leave
34. This arrangement has another modest advantage. In their modem forms, both personal
and subject matter jurisdiction relate the existence ofjurisdiction to the nature of the underlying
claim. One can talk about this question more easily when students have some notion of the
nature of a claim.
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 13.
36. FED. R. Cv. P. 14.
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students studying the statute on supplemental jurisdiction at the same time as they
are studying the Rules to which that statute most frequently refers.
One does not draft jurisdictional statutes with students as a primary audience.
But judges and lawyers, like students, often find themselves needing as much
clarity as we can manage to give them. Because jurisdictional statutes function
as part of a larger procedural system, a jurisdictional statute acknowledging that
link is better-all things being equal-than one that does not. With this
recognition, pedagogy and policy can join their voices in hoping that any revised
statute will exhibit the same thoughtful consciousness of its home in an existing
procedural system.
